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Abstract—Phrase search allows retrieval of documents con-
taining an exact phrase, which plays an important role in
many machine learning applications for cloud-based IoT, such
as intelligent medical data analytics. In order to protect sensitive
information from being leaked by service providers, documents
(e.g., clinic records) are usually encrypted by data owners before
being outsourced to the cloud. This, however, makes the search
operation an extremely challenging task. Existing searchable
encryption schemes for multi-keyword search operations fail to
perform phrase search, as they are unable to determine the
location relationship of multiple keywords in a queried phrase
over encrypted data on the cloud server side.
In this paper, we propose P3, an efficient privacy-preserving
phrase search scheme for intelligent encrypted data processing
in cloud-based IoT. Our scheme exploits the homomorphic en-
cryption and bilinear map to determine the location relationship
of multiple queried keywords over encrypted data. It also utilizes
a probabilistic trapdoor generation algorithm to protect users’
search patterns. Thorough security analysis demonstrates the
security guarantees achieved by P3. We implement a prototype
and conduct extensive experiments on real-world datasets. The
evaluation results show that compared with existing multi-
keyword search schemes, P3 can greatly improve the search
accuracy with moderate overheads.
Index Terms—Phrase search, encrypted data, artificial intelli-
gence, IoT, cloud
I. INTRODUCTION
PHRASE search, which allows users to search for sen-tences or documents containing a specific phrase that
consists of a set of consecutive keywords [1], serves as an
important building block in many machine learning appli-
cations for cloud-based IoT [27]. For instance, it can be
applied to intelligent clinical data analytics collected from
medical IoT devices, which retrieves medical records related
to a certain disease (e.g., myocardial infarction) and feeds
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machine learning algorithms to obtain portent symptoms of
the disease. It can also be applied to the emerging entity-
oriented search [21], which identifies the records within which
the exact description of an entity (e.g., person or event) occurs.
The resulting records can be utilized for situation assessment
and intelligent decision making. Another application scenario
refers to the semantic search in knowledge graphs, which
searches for entities with semantic similarity (e.g., titles,
positions, and interests) and provides input signals to machine
learning models for recommendation of products, news, and
advertisements.
The combination of cloud computing and IoT enables
powerful processing of data beyond individual IoT devices
with limited capabilities. This, however, raises a great concern
about the security and privacy of IoT data stored in the cloud,
as untrusted cloud service providers may get access to sensitive
data or even result in data leakage accidents [25, 26]. In order
to protect data privacy, data owners can opt to encrypt their
sensitive data before outsourcing the storage of the data to
remote cloud servers. For instance, a healthcare company may
store their encrypted patients’ records in the cloud, and allow
only the authorized users to perform phrase search over these
records. This naturally imposes a requirement on the cloud-
based search engine to perform phrase search operations over
encrypted data.
Many schemes [2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–20, 23, 29–
35, 38] have been proposed to enable efficient search oper-
ations over encrypted textual data, as summarized in Table
I. Existing solutions to the single-keyword and multi-keyword
search problems cannot be used to perform phrase search over
encrypted documents, because they are unable to determine the
positional1 relationship of the keywords composing a phrase
in the encrypted environment. For instance, the conjunctive
keyword search scheme [4] will return a document if it
contains each keyword at least once, regardless of whether
these keywords appear consecutively as a phrase. Therefore,
if we use this scheme for phrase search, we would end with
inaccurate results (cf. Section VI).
There are a limited number of studies targeting the phrase
search problem over encrypted data [20, 30, 38]. These
solutions, however, generally involve notable limitations as
shown in Table I, e.g., by either requiring resource-consuming
multiple rounds of client-server interactions, or relying on a
trusted third-party (TTP) for search result refinement on the
1We use the terminologies of positional information and location informa-
tion interchangeably in this paper.
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2behalf of the client.
Since the client-side IoT devices usually have constrained
computing and storage resources, we aim at developing a
phrase search scheme that achieves all of the attributes listed
in Table I. The main challenge is to enable cloud servers to
make a judgement on whether the keywords occurring in an
encrypted document are consecutive or not, without leaking
sensitive information.
In this paper, we propose P3, a new Privacy-Preserving
Phrase search scheme over cloud-based encrypted data. We
take advantage of the inverted index structure to build a secure
index that achieves greater flexibility and efficiency. The
inverted index is one of the most popular and efficient index
structures for plaintext search. Compared with the diverse self-
designed index structures [4, 5, 23, 29, 32], the inverted index
structure can improve retrieval efficiency and scalability in
practice. To tackle the challenge of determining the positional
relationship of queried keywords over encrypted data, we
resort to the homomorphic encryption and bilinear map, which
enables the client to obtain exact search results from a single
interaction with the cloud server. As the phrase search is a
special case of multi-keyword search, our solution can also
perform conjunctive multi-keyword search efficiently.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We propose a secure single-interaction phrase search
scheme that enables phrase search over encrypted data in
cloud-based IoT, without relying on a trusted third-party.
2) We employ the combination of homomorphic encryption
and bilinear map to determine the pairwise positional
relationship of queried keywords on the cloud server
side. It can be used as a building block in other relevant
application scenarios.
3) We implement a prototype of P3 and conduct extensive
experimental evaluation using real-world datasets. Results
demonstrate that P3 greatly improves the search accuracy
with moderate overheads.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. We summarize the
related work in Section II and present the problem formulation
in Section III. We describe the proposed scheme in Section IV
and provide the security analysis in Section V. We evaluate
P3 through extensive experiments in Section VI and discuss
the limitations in Section VII. Finally, we conclude this paper
in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The privacy-preserving data processing problem has at-
tracted great research attention during the last decade [13,
17, 36, 37]. The secure searchable encryption problem was
first addressed by Song et al. [28], which was index-free
and could merely support exact single keyword search. In
order to extend the functionality and efficiency of searchable
encryption, follow-ups have proposed various schemes that
support single keyword search [7, 18, 33] and exact or fuzzy
multi-keyword search [4, 5, 12, 15, 16, 19, 23, 29, 31, 32, 34],
by using either self-designed indexes or the typical inverted
index structure. Several attempts have been taken to extend the
fuzzy multi-keyword search scheme to support phrase search,
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PRIOR SOLUTIONS AND P3
Solutions MultipleKeywords
Phrase
Search
Single
Interaction
T.T.P.
Free
Single keyword
search [7, 18, 33] × ×
√ √
Multi-keyword search
[4, 23, 29, 31]
[5, 12, 19, 32, 34]
√ × √ √
Phrase search
[20, 30]
√ √ × √
Phrase search
[38]
√ √ √ ×
P3
√ √ √ √
either by treating a pre-defined phrase (e.g., network security)
as a single keyword [6] or introducing a TTP server on the
client side [38].
Tang et al. [30] proposed a phrase search construction over
encrypted cloud data, but failed to implement and evaluate
their proposal in real-world application scenarios. For each
individual phrase recognition, this construction needed two
rounds of communications between the client and the server,
and also required a large number of trapdoors generated by the
client. The authors in [20] proposed a phrase search scheme
with relatively low storage and computational overhead. How-
ever, they failed to present a complete threat model, a security
definition, or a reasonable security proof. Therefore, it remains
unclear about the privacy guarantees provided by the proposed
method.
In contrast to the existing phrase search solutions, the
phrase search scheme proposed in this paper is a single-
interaction scheme without a TTP. Therefore, it can achieve
higher flexibility and lower communication overhead.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formally define the secure phrase search
problem in intelligent processing of encrypted data. We denote
several keywords whose locations in the documents are con-
secutive are a phrase. We denote a keyword collection of the
documents and their corresponding document identifier and
location information as an index, and an encrypted index as a
secure index. We refer to a searched phrase as a query and an
encrypted query as a trapdoor.
A. System Model
The privacy-preserving phrase search system over encrypted
data involves three entities, namely a IoT data owner, a cloud
server, and one or multiple users, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The data owner generates a secure searchable index for the
document set and outsources the secure index along with
the encrypted document set to the cloud server. When an
authorized user, say Alice, performs a phrase search over
the encrypted documents, she first acquires the corresponding
trapdoor from the data owner through the search control mech-
anism (e.g., broadcast encryption [7]), and then submits the
trapdoor to the cloud server. Upon receiving Alice’s trapdoor,
the cloud server executes the predesigned search algorithms
and replies to the user with the corresponding set of encrypted
3Fig. 1. System model of cloud-based phrase search over encrypted data
documents as the search results. Finally, the user decrypts the
received documents with the help of the data owner.
We assume that both the user and the data owner have
limited computation and storage capacities on a practical basis.
Existing key management mechanisms [9, 10, 22] can be
employed to manage the encryption capabilities of authorized
users.
The above scheme is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1. (Privacy-Preserving Phrase Search Scheme).
A privacy-preserving phrase search scheme consists of the
following polynomial time algorithms:
• KeyGen(τ, d): Let τ and d be security parameters as
inputs of KeyGen(·), and a master key Mk be an output.
• IndexGen(Mk,Γ): It executes on the data owner side
and takes the master key Mk and the document collection
Γ as inputs and the secure index Î as an output.
• TrapdoorGen(Mk,Q): Given the master key Mk and a
query Q from a user, it outputs the secure trapdoor TQ.
This process is also performed on the data owner side.
• Query(̂I,TQ): Given the secure index Î and the trapdoor
TQ, it performs search operations on the cloud server side
and returns query results.
B. Security Model
Similar to the existing searchable encryption solutions
[31, 32], we consider the cloud server as an honest-but-curious
adversary. That is, the cloud server would honestly follow
the predesigned phrase search protocols and correctly provide
the corresponding services to users, but, it may be curious
about the contents of the documents and attempt to learn
additional information by analyzing the trapdoor and indexes.
For instance, it would infer the keywords in the index and
trapdoors, as well as their locations in the documents.
Motivated by the existing literature [4, 23, 32], we consider
the following two threat models with different attack capa-
bilities, depending on the sensitive information that can be
obtained by the cloud server:
• Known Ciphertext Model. The cloud server can only
access the encrypted document set and the corresponding
secure index that are outsourced by the data owner, and
the trapdoors submitted by users. The cloud server is also
capable of recording the search history, such as the search
results in terms of encrypted documents.
• Known Background Model. In this stronger model,
the cloud server is assumed to be aware of more facts
than what can be known in the known ciphertext model.
In particular, the cloud server can learn the statistical
information, such as keyword frequency in the document
set. Furthermore, given such statistical information, the
cloud server may infer the keywords in a queried phrase.
Our scheme aims at protecting privacy associated with the
phrase search operation, which consists of three types of
privacy, namely the document set privacy, the index privacy,
and the trapdoor privacy. The document set privacy can be
easily achieved by encrypting the documents using a block
cipher, such as AES, before outsourcing them to the cloud
server. Therefore, in this paper we focus on the latter two
aspects, which are described as follows:
• Index privacy. Since the secure index can be regarded as
a representation of the encrypted documents, any further
information (e.g., keywords) should not be deduced from
the index by the cloud server, except for the relationship
between a trapdoor and its corresponding search results.
In general, index privacy refers to the information of
keywords, document identifiers, and keyword locations.
Here, the keyword location privacy is guaranteed once
the location information of all keywords is protected.
We assume that the relationship between the keyword
locations can be revealed to the cloud server, which does
not go against the keyword location privacy.
• Trapdoor unlinkability. The trapdoors are used by the
cloud server to perform matches with the secure index.
Intuitively, the trapdoors should not reveal any valuable
information (e.g., search frequency). The unlinkability
means that the cloud server is unable to associate a
trapdoor with the corresponding search phrase, i.e., the
trapdoors generated for the same plaintext phrase should
be different in multiple queries (e.g., queries submitted
by multiple users or at different time periods).
C. Definition and Notation
Now, we introduce the main notations and the rest of the
notations are summarized in Table II.
• Γ: a finite set of documents stored in plaintext, denoted
as Γ = (f1, f2, . . . , fm), where fi is the i-th document.
• W : a finite set of keywords extracted from the document
set Γ, denoted as W = (w1, w2, . . . , wµ), where wi is
the i-th keyword in W .
• I: an inverted index of the document set Γ, denoted as
I = (Iw1 , Iw2 , . . . , Iwµ), where Iwi is the inverted list
corresponding to wi. For each inverted list, we have
Iwi = (wi,Ωi1,Ωi2, . . . ,Ωik), where Ωij represents the
j-th entity in Iwi . Let Ωij = (fij ,Λij) be a tuple of
the document identifier fij ∈ Γ (1 ≤ j ≤ k) and the
location identifier Λij . Λij is a list of keyword locations
in fij , which is denoted by Λij = 〈lj1, lj2, . . . , ljt〉. Here
ljr (1 ≤ r ≤ t) is the location where the keyword wi
appears in the document fij .
D. Preliminaries
Bilinear map is a function combining elements of two
groups (e.g., G1 and G2) to yield an element of a third
4TABLE II
NOTATIONS FOR PHRASE SEARCH SCHEME
Notation Definition
Î The encrypted form of I
Q A query consisting of multiple keywords in W
|Q| Number of keywords in the query Q
TQ Trapdoor of the query Q
|I| Number of items in the inverted index
|Iwi | Number of documents containing the keyword wi
η Maximum number of entries in a secure inverted list
group (e.g., GT ). We now briefly review it. For simplicity,
we consider a special case where G1 = G2 = G.
Let G and GT be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of a
finite order n, and g be a generator of G. A bilinear map e is
a function in Eq. (1),
e : G×G→ GT , (1)
with a useful property: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, we have
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab, yet e(g, g) is a generator of GT .
Homomorphic encryption is a cryptography primitive that
allows us to perform operations over encrypted data without
knowing the secret key or decrypting the data. Boneh et al.
[3] proposed a homomorphic encryption scheme based on
finite groups of composite order that supported a bilinear map,
which can be briefly described in the following three steps:
• Key generation. Assume that G and GT are two (multipli-
cation) cyclic groups of finite order n, and e is a bilinear
map. Let g and u be two random generators of G, and
p, q be two big primes satisfying n = pq. Set h = uq ,
then let pk = (n,G,GT , e, g, h) and sk = p.
• Encryption. A message m can be encrypted to its cipher-
text c as follows
c = gmhr ∈ G,
where r is randomly picked in {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
• Decryption. A ciphertext c is decrypted as follows
cp = (gmhr)
p
= gmpurpq = (gp)
m
(mod n).
Let gˆ = gp. One needs to compute the discrete log of cp
base gˆ to recover m.
This scheme has the additive homomorphism over the
encrypted data feature. Given the ciphertext E(a) and E(b),
we can get the result of a+ b by E(a) ·E(b), i.e., E(a+ b) =
E(a) · E(b). This feature allows us to calculate the sum of
two numbers by their ciphertexts without decryption.
IV. SECURE PHRASE SEARCH FOR INTELLIGENT
PROCESSING OF ENCRYPTED DATA
This section presents the proposed privacy-preserving
phrase search scheme over encrypted data.
A. System Overview
The structure and workflow of the proposed scheme, P3,
are depicted in Fig. 2, which mainly consists of the following
three modules:
Fig. 2. The structure and workflow of the proposed scheme P3
Fig. 3. An example of the inverted index. (Encryptions are not shown).
• Index Generator, which is executed on the data owner
side. It takes the documents as the input and outputs
the corresponding secure index, as well as the encrypted
documents.
• Trapdoor Generator, which is also executed on the data
owner side. Given a user’s queried phrase, it generates
the corresponding secure trapdoor and replies to the user.
• Phrase Search Algorithm, which is executed on the cloud
server side. Upon receiving a trapdoor from a user, it
performs a phrase search procedure over the secure index
and returns the search results.
In order to support phrase search, we leverage the inverted
index structure and store the keyword locations along with the
document identifier, as shown in Fig. 3 (cf. Section III-C for
explanations of notations). In the example illustrated in Fig.
3, there are two files containing the keyword heart, namely
Files 1 and 6. More precisely, the locations of heart in File 1
are 5, 12, and 20, respectively.
The phrase search procedure can be described as follows.
When the cloud server receives the trapdoor for a specific
phrase query from a user, it first locates the inverted lists
for the queried keywords, and then finds the documents that
contain all of the queried keywords. After that, the cloud
server identifies whether the locations of the keywords are
consecutive and returns only the relevant documents that
contain the exact phrase. As shown in Fig. 3, File 1 should be
returned if the user queries the phrase “heart attack”.
It is easy to perform phrase search over plaintexts. However,
it is difficult for the server to determine whether or not the
keywords occur in documents as a phrase, given the encrypted
location information of each pair of keywords. To tackle
5Algorithm 1 EncKeywordForIndex(·)
Input: {wi,K, S,M1,M2}, where K is secret key of PRF pi and
S, M1, and M2 are the secret keys of the secure kNN technique.
Define S(i) as the i-th bit in S.
Output: The encrypted keyword identifier Z˜wi in the index.
1: Construct a vector B˜ = {pi(K,wi)0, . . . , pi(K,wi)d−1}T , where
d is the length of S and pi(·) is a secure PRF primitive.
2: for i← 1 to d do
3: if S(i) = 1 then
4: Split B˜(i) randomly into B˜a(i) and B˜b(i) with B˜a(i) +
B˜b(i) = B˜(i).
5: else
6: Set both B˜a(i) and B˜b(i) to B˜(i).
7: end if
8: end for
9: Encrypt B˜ as MT1 B˜a and MT2 B˜b.
10: Set Z˜wi = {MT1 B˜a,MT2 B˜b}.
11: return Z˜wi
this challenge, we propose a series of designs based on the
homomorphic encryption [3] and bilinear groups. We also
utilize the widely used secure kNN method [4, 23, 32] to
achieve trapdoor unlinkability.
B. Building Blocks
As described in Section IV-A, we should ensure privacy in
the index generation, the trapdoor generation, and the phrase
search procedures. We now introduce basic building blocks to
achieve these goals.
1) Keyword representation in the secure index and the
trapdoor. We utilize a similar technique as in the literature
[23] to achieve the goals of index privacy and trapdoor
unlinkability.
Our design is based on the following observation. Given a
polynomial function f(x) of degree m, which is denoted by
f(x) = (x − t1)(x − t2)· · ·(x − tm) = a0 + a1x + . . . +
amx
m, we can extract the coefficients to form a vector A =
{a0, a1, . . ., am}. We can also construct another vector B =
{t0, t1, . . . , tm}T , where t ∈ {t1, t2, . . . , tm}. Note that tm
represents t to the power of m. Since t is a root of f(x), we
have AT ·B = 0.
Based on the above knowledge, for any single keyword we
construct two vectors, A and B, as its representations in the
trapdoor and the index, respectively. Then, we can know if
a keyword in the trapdoor matches a keyword in the index
by checking whether AT · B = 0. Hence, we now focus on
constructing these two vectors for private-preserving matching.
To generate the encrypted keyword identifier Z˜wi for each
keyword wi ∈ W , we utilize the secure kNN technique, as
depicted in Algorithm 1. The algorithm includes two steps,
where the first step is to create the vector B˜ (line 1), and
the second step is to obtain the encrypted keyword identifier
Z˜wi by splitting B˜ randomly into two vectors B˜
a(i) and B˜b(i)
(lines 2-9). According to the value of each element in S, B˜a(i)
and B˜b(i) are assigned with different values. We refer the
readers to the literature [4, 23, 32] for the rationale of secure
kNN.
To construct a secure trapdoor for a query Q, we also utilize
the secure kNN technique to construct the encrypted keyword
Algorithm 2 EncKeywordForTrapdoor(·)
Input: {wi,K, S,M1,M2}, where K is secret key of PRF pi and
S, M1, and M2 are the secret keys of the secure kNN technique.
Define S(i) as the i-th bit in S.
Output: The encrypted keyword identifier Y˜wi in the trapdoor.
1: Construct a keyword vector Φ = {wi, w′1, . . . , w′d−2}, where d is
the length of S and {w′1, . . . , w′d−2} are d−2 dummy keywords.
2: Get a vector Φ˜ = {pi(K,wi), pi(K,w′1), . . . , pi(K,w′d−2)},
where d is the length of S and pi(·) is a secure PRF primitive.
3: Construct a polynomial function of degree d − 1 as f(x) =
(x− pi(K,wi))× (x− pi(K,w′1))× · · · × (x− pi(K,w′d−2)) =
a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ ad−1xd−1.
4: Extract the coefficients of f(x) to form the query vector A˜ =
{a0, a1, . . . , ad−1}T .
5: for i← 1 to d do
6: if S(i) = 0 then
7: Split A˜(i) randomly into A˜a(i) and A˜b(i), where A˜a(i)+
A˜b(i) = A˜(i).
8: else
9: Set both A˜a(i) and A˜b(i) to A˜(i).
10: end if
11: end for
12: Encrypt A˜ as M−11 A˜
a and M−12 A˜
b.
13: Set Y˜wi = {M−11 A˜a,M−12 A˜b}.
14: return Y˜wi
identifier Y˜wi for each keyword wi ∈ Q, as described in
Algorithm 2. It consists of two steps, where the first step (lines
1-4) is to create the vector A˜, and the second step (lines 5-12)
is to spilt A˜ to obtain the encrypted keyword identifier Y˜wi .
Based on the above constructions, given an encrypted key-
word identifier Y˜wi in a trapdoor, the cloud server can locate
an inverted list with an encrypted keyword identifier Z˜wi , by
checking whether Y˜ Twi · Z˜wi = 0.
The correctness of this construction is illustrated by Eq. (2).
Y˜ Twi · Z˜wi ={M−11 A˜a,M−12 A˜b}
T · {MT1 B˜a,MT2 B˜b}
=(A˜a)
T
(M−11 )
T
MT1 B˜
a + (A˜b)
T
(M−12 )
T
MT2 B˜
b
=(A˜a)
T
B˜a + (A˜b)
T
B˜b = A˜T · B˜
(2)
The secure kNN method is vulnerable to linear analysis, and
this means that the cloud server may launch the linear analysis
on a large number of pairs of keyword identifiers between
the secure index and the trapdoors. To address this limitation,
we adopt dummy keywords in the procedure of trapdoor
generation (lines 1-3 in Aigorithm 2). Therefore, for the same
keyword over multiple queries, we can obtain a different
coefficient vector A˜ (line 4 in Algorithm 2). Furthermore,
due to the property of the secure KNN technique, we can
perform various splittings over a coefficient vector A˜. Hence,
our construction is secure against linear analysis.
2) Phrase recognition. To protect the keyword location
privacy, we encrypt the keyword location through the homo-
morphic encryption scheme introduced in Section III-D.
Note that in our scheme, we only publish (n,G,GT , e)
to the cloud server as the public key. Assume that a and
b represent locations of two different keywords in a same
document. Without loss of generality, we also assume that
a < b. If these two keywords are consecutive, we have
a − b + 1 = 0, i.e., b − a = 1. To determine the relationship
6between a and b on the basis of their ciphertexts gahr1 and
gbhr2 , the cloud server sets x = a− b+ 1 and transforms this
problem to an equivalent problem of determining whether x
is the ciphertext of 0, as shown in Eq. (3),
E(x) = E(a− b+ 1)
= gahr1 · (gbhr2)−1 · g1hr3 = gxhr
(3)
where g1hr3 represents the ciphertext of 1.
Then, the cloud server further determines the relationship
between a and b depending on the result of Eq. (4),
e(E(x), λp) = e(gxhr, λp) (4)
where λ ∈ G, p is the private key, and λp is the dispersal
factor that cannot be an identity of G.
Until now, the cloud server has known gxhr and λp. To
eliminate the random value r, it then computes e(gxhr, λp)
by bilinear maps. Note that a and b represent consecutive
locations if and only if the result of Eq. (4) is equal to 1,
as e(gxhr, λp) = e(g0hr, λp) = e(hr, λp) = e(h, λ)rp =
e(hrp, λ) = e(1, λ) = 1.
The idea of such a design comes from the fact that
we can eliminate the existence of the random value r for
(hr)
p
= urpq = urn = 1 (mod n). However, since the phrase
recognition procedure is performed by the cloud server, a user
cannot send p to the cloud server directly. Therefore, the user
randomly picks an element λ ∈ G and sends λp to the cloud
server. Since λ and p are both secret, the cloud server cannot
infer p from λp.
Now we briefly discuss the construction of the phrase
recognition process. First, at a high level, we want to protect
the keyword location information, rather than the keyword
location relationship in the phrase search. This is because
revealing the keyword location relationship is inevitable to
perform phrase recognition. Second, the recognition method
can determine an arbitrary interval for two integers. In other
words, if we want to know whether the interval between
two locations a and b is d, we can just send gdhr to the
cloud server, where r is a random number. In addition, the
ciphertexts for the same d over multiple queries are different.
This property can prevent the cloud server from inferring the
interval d, because the cloud server cannot know the real value
of d even if it learns that a and b satisfy a certain relationship.
Note that this application scenario is different from the well-
known secure multi-party computation (i.e., SMC). In the set-
ting of SMC, set of parties with private inputs wish to compute
a function of their inputs while revealing nothing but the result
of the function, which is used for many practical applications
such as exchange markets. SMC is a collaborative computing
problem that solves the privacy preserving problem among
a group of mutually untrusted participants. Thus the SMC
schemes are fully secure, they protect the location relationship
between keywords against the cloud server. As a result, the
phrase recognition procedure can only be performed on either
the user side or the data owner side, which sacrifices the main
benefit of offloading computation to cloud servers. Therefore,
we make a compromise that revealing the relationship between
keyword locations for better efficiency.
3) Division and padding of inverted list. To protect the
keyword privacy, it is necessary to hide its appearance fre-
quency in each document. We divide each inverted list to make
it contain η documents. Then, if the length of an (original or
divided) inverted list is smaller than η, we perform a padding
for the remaining entries. In the example shown in Fig. 3,
we choose η = 2 and divide “attack” into two inverted lists,
where the second list has a padding entry. More precisely, each
entity that we pad consists of an invalid document identifier
and some random numbers as fake keyword locations.
In order to distinguish these invalid document identifiers
from the valid ones, we use a counter that is initialized as
−1 and gradually decrease it by 1 for each padded document
identifier. Due to the encryption of the invalid and valid docu-
ment identifiers, the cloud server cannot tell which document
identifer is invalid.
Since we utilize the probabilistic encryption, a same key-
word wi will have different ciphertexts (i.e., the encrypted
keyword identifier Z˜wi ). Therefore, from the perspective of
the cloud server, it seems that each inverted list corresponds
to a unique keyword. In the performance evaluation, we select
η as the frequency median of all the keywords in the document
set. We leave the exploration of optimal η to the future work.
C. Scheme Details
This section describes the privacy-preserving phrase search
scheme in detail, which consists of four components.
• KeyGen(τ, d): Given the security parameters τ and d,
the data owner generates the master key and the public key
by taking the following steps:
1) Generate two random τ -bit big primes p and q, and set
n = p ∗ q. Construct the bilinear groups G and GT and the
bilinear map e using the method introduced in the literature
[3]. Then, pick two random generators, g and u, from G, and
set h = uq . Note that h is a random generator of the subgroup
of G of order p.
2) Randomly generate a d-bit binary string S and two d×d
invertible matrices M1 and M2. Let S(i) be the i-th bit of S.
3) Let pi be a secure pseudorandom function (PRF) primitive
and generate a τ -bit secret key K.
4) Let ν be a secure pseudorandom permutation (PRP)
primitive and generate a τ -bit secret key U .
The data owner keeps the tuple (p, g, h,K,U, S,M1,M2)
as the master key (i.e., Mk) and the tuple (n,G,GT , e) as the
public key (i.e., pk), which is published to the cloud server.
• IndexGen(Mk,Γ): The data owner builds the secure
inverted index in the following steps:
1) Extract a distinct keyword collection W of size µ from
the document collection Γ. For each keyword wi ∈ W (1 ≤
i ≤ µ), build the inverted list Iwi as described in Fig. 3,
which consists of the identifiers of documents that contain
keyword wi along with all the keyword locations, i.e., Iwi =
(wi,Ωi1,Ωi2, . . . ,Ωik), where Ωij = (fij ,Λij) and Λij =
〈lj1, lj2, . . . , ljt〉, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 1 ≤ r ≤ t. Set the inverted
index I = {Iw1 , Iw2 , . . . , Iwµ}.
2) For each Iwi ∈ I, encrypt the document identifier by
ν(U, fij) and encrypt the keyword locations.
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number rjy ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}; then, we have the encrypted
location cjy as described by Eq. (5).
cjy = g
ljyhrjy (5)
To hide keyword frequencies, we should guarantee that
different keywords have the same frequency. Hence, the data
owner should further process Iwi via division and padding.
If b|Iwi | mod ηe = 0, divide Iwi into |Iwi |/η individual
inverted lists, which are defined as {Iwi1 , Iwi2 , . . . , Iwit},
1 ≤ t ≤ |Iwi |/η. While if b|Iwi | mod ηe 6= 0, divide Iwi
into 1 + |Iwi |/η individual inverted lists, which are defined as
{Iwi1 , Iwi2 , . . . , Iwit}, 1 ≤ t ≤ 1 + |Iwi |/η. For Iwit where
t = 1 + |Iwi |/η, the data owner pads some random dummy
document identifiers and binary strings of length |cjy| to make
sure that the keyword document frequency is η.
3) For each inverted list Iwit of the keyword wit, encrypt
the keyword wit to obtain the encrypted keyword identifier
Z˜wit using Algorithm 1. Then, update wit with Z˜wit . We now
get the secure inverted index Î = {{̂Iwit}}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ µ.
• TrapdoorGen(Mk,Q): Given a query Q, a user can
retrieve the corresponding trapdoor from the data owner, which
takes the following steps:
1) For each wj ∈ Q, 1 ≤ j ≤ |Q|, generate the encrypted
query keyword identifier Y˜wj using Algorithm 2.
2) We assume that the search distance β is 1. Pick a random
number r ∈ [0, n− 1], and then compute the ciphertext of 1:
C = g1hr (6)
3) Randomly pick an element λ ∈ G, and then compute the
dispersal factor, ψ = λp, where λp is not an identity of G.
The trapdoor TQ = {{Y˜wj},C, ψ}, where 1 ≤ j ≤ |Q|.
•Query(̂I,TQ): Once the cloud server receives the trapdoor
from the user, the cloud server first locates the inverted lists
corresponding to the queried keywords, by checking whether
Y˜ Twj · Z˜wit is equal to 0. As described in Section IV-B,
an equality indicates a match of the queried keyword and
the inverted list. We assume that the corresponding inverted
lists are ÎQ = {̂Iwi}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, i.e., k = |̂IQ|.
Then, the server identifies the documents containing the exact
queried phrase by determining the positional relationship of
the keywords using Eqs. (3) and (4). Finally, the server replies
to the user with the search results, i.e., the corresponding
encrypted documents that contain the queried phrase.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents the security analysis under the known
ciphertext model and the known background model. We adopt
the security definitions in the literature [7].
• History. Let Γ be a file set and I be the index built from
Γ. A history over Γ is a tuple H = (Γ, I, w), where w is
a phrase containing k keywords w = (w1, w2, . . . , wk).
• View, denoted by V (H), is the encrypted form of H
under a certain secret key sk. In general, a V (H) consists
of the encrypted documents Encsk(Γ), the secure index
Encsk(I(Γ)), and the secure trapdoor Encsk(w). Note
that the cloud server can only know the views.
• Trace. The trace of history, which is denoted by Tr(H),
consists of exactly the information we are willing to
leak about the history and nothing else. More precisely,
it should be the access patterns and the search re-
sults induced by H . The trace induced by a history
H = (Γ, I, w), is a sequence Tr(H) = Tr(w) =
{Rw, (δi)w⊂δi , 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ|}, where w should occur in
the document δi as a phrase, and Rw indicates whether
these keywords constitute a phrase in the documents.
Theorem 1. Our phrase search scheme is secure under the
known ciphertext model.
Intuitively, given two histories with the same trace, if the
cloud server cannot distinguish which one is generated by a
simulator, we can say that it cannot learn additional informa-
tion about the secure index or the encrypted documents, except
for the access patterns and search results.
Proof. Assume that S is a simulator that can simulate a view
V
′
indistinguishable from the view obtained by the cloud
server. To achieve this, we construct the simulator as follows:
• S selects a random δ
′
i ∈ {0, 1}|δi|, δi ∈ Γ, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ|,
and then outputs Γ
′
= {δ′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ
′ |}.
• S first generates two random τ -bit big primes p′ and
q′ to obtain n′ = p′ ∗ q′, and constructs the bilin-
ear groups G′ and G′T . Then, S selects two random
generators g′ and u′ from G′ and obtains h′ = u′q
′
.
Finally, S randomly picks a d-bit binary string S′, two
d×d invertible matrices M ′1,M
′
2, a secure hash function
pi(·) with a secret key K ′, and a secure pseudo-random
permutation (PRP) primitive ν with the secret key U ′.
Let sk′ = {p′, g′, h′,K ′, U ′, S′,M ′1,M
′
2}.
• S generates I′(Γ′) with the same dictionary W as Γ. For
each wi ∈W , S takes the following steps:
1) S picks a random binary string as the inverted list
I′wi , which has the same length as the actual inverted list
Iwi . Ensure that if wi ∈W and wi ⊂ δi, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ|, the
inverted list I′wi should contain the identifier ν(U
′, id(δi))
of δi. Meanwhile, if w occurs in δi as a phrase, we should
also ensure that w occurs in δ
′
i as a phrase.
2) S gets B˜′ = {pi(K ′, wi)0, . . . , pi(K ′, wi)d−1}
T
and
computes Encsk′(B˜′). Finally, S obtains Encsk′(I′(Γ′)).
• S constructs the query w′ and the corresponding trapdoor
as follows. For each wi ∈ w, S constructs the encrypted
keyword identifier Y˜wj by Algorithm 2. Then S sets
Encsk′(w
′) = {{Y˜wj}, Encsk′(1), λ′p
′} as the trapdoor,
where λ′ is a random element of G′ and 1 ≤ j ≤ |w′|.
• Finally, S outputs the view V ′ =
(Γ′, Encsk′(I ′(Γ′)), Encsk′(w′)).
The correctness of the construction is easy to demon-
strate, as the secure index Encsk′(I ′(Γ′)) and the trapdoor
Encsk′(w
′) generate the same trace as the one obtained by the
cloud server. Hence, we can claim that for any probabilistic
polynomial-time (P.P.T.) adversary, V ′ cannot be distinguished
from V (H). Furthermore, no P.P.T. adversary can distinguish
the Γ′ from Encsk(Γ) for the semantic security of the
symmetric encryption. The indistinguishability of the index
and trapdoors are guaranteed and enhanced together by the
8indistinguishability of the secure kNN technique, the random
number introduced in the splitting process, and the use of
probabilistic encryption.
Theorem 2. Our phrase search scheme is secure under the
known background model.
Intuitively, given a view generated by the simulator, if the
cloud server, who has several pairs of queried phrases and
trapdoors, cannot distinguish it from the view he owns, we can
say that the proposed phrase search scheme is secure under
the known background model.
Proof. Based on the above construction, we can claim that
no P.P.T. adversary can distinguish the view V ′ from V (H)
with a certain number of pairs of keywords and trapdoors.
Particularly, no P.P.T. adversary can distinguish the Γ′ from
Encsk(Γ) for the semantic security of the symmetric en-
cryption. Due to the usage of the dummy keywords and the
probabilistic encryption, the same queries will have different
trapdoors. Therefore, the P.P.T. adversary cannot launch the
linear analysis using the pairs of queried phrases and trap-
doors. Thus, the indistinguishability of indices and trapdoors
are guaranteed.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of P3 through
extensive experiments using real-world datasets.
A. Experiment Setup
Testbed. To simulate the cloud-based service environment,
we use an Aliyun server instance2 as the cloud server, which
is equipped with an Intel Xeon processor at 2.60 GHz and 8
GB RAM.
Dataset. We use a collection of the RFCs (Requests for
Comments [24]) as the real-world dataset for evaluation. Each
file contains a large number of technical phrases, e.g., error
detection. We randomly pick up 2500 files from the publicly
available RFCs. For each file in the dataset, we build a full-
text index, which is the same as the one commonly used by
modern search engines.
Methods to compare. We compare P3 with a representative
phrase search solution [30] and the traditional multi-keyword
conjunctive search scheme, which are referred to as PSSE and
conjunctive search, respectively. Since an implementation of
PSSE is not given in the literature [30], we implement it using
Java. The conjunctive search scheme can be implemented
simply by ignoring the phrase recognition procedure in P3.
Although it is not an exact implementation of an existing
solution in the literature, it can still help us to understand the
differences of the results returned by the conjunctive multi-
keyword search and the phrase search. We use a 128-bit
security parameter in all the three methods.
The threshold parameter η is set to be 32, which is as the
frequency median of all keywords in the document set. We
denote |Q| as the phrase length (i.e., the number of keywords
in the phrase) and m as the number of documents.
2https://www.aliyun.com/
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF INDEX CONSTRUCTION OVERHEADS
Metrics / Methods Number of Documents500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Time
(h)
PSSE 0.23 2.9 5.4 8.3 11.8
P3 0.64 3.5 7.1 11.2 15.1
Volume
(GB)
PSSE 1.48 19.9 35.9 57.5 78.3
P3 0.08 0.31 0.56 0.87 1.15
Query sets. We generate the querying phrases by randomly
choosing phrases with semantics from the file set, e.g., sophis-
ticated terminals, interrupt characters, shared memory, etc. We
use the same query length setting as existing studies [1], where
|Q| takes the concrete values of 2, 3, 4, and 5.
B. Search Accuracy
We adopt a definition of the search accuracy widely used in
the literature [32]. Given a phrase query, the search accuracy
P is calculated as P = tp/(fp + tp), where tp and fp are
the numbers of relevant (i.e., containing the exact phrase) and
irrelevant (i.e., containing all the keywords rather than the
exact phrase) documents in the search results.
We first fix |Q| = 2 and explore the numbers of matched
documents for each method with varying scales of the docu-
ment set, as shown in Fig. 4(a). Compared with the conjunctive
search scheme, P3 and PSSE can remarkably reduce the
number of matched documents.
The precision with respect to different query lengths for
each method is depicted in Fig. 4(b). Here, the plain index
phrase search scheme serves as the baseline of the precision.
We can see that the precisions of P3 and PSSE are 100% in
all the cases, whereas those of the conjunctive search scheme
are less than 20% in all the cases.
C. Search Efficiency
Index Construction. The index construction process is a
one-time, offline computation. The time and storage overheads
of the index construction are depicted in Table III. Clearly,
the overheads increase when the document set gets larger. For
the same document set, the index size of PSSE is much larger
than that of P3. As to the index construction time, P3 requires
slightly more time than PSSE, which is primarily caused by
the encryption operations of the keyword locations.
Trapdoor Generation. The trapdoor generation time for
each method with different query lengths is depicted in Fig.
5. P3 has a higher time cost of trapdoor generation than the
conjunctive search scheme, because it needs extra operations
(e.g., generating dispersal factor) to generate additional in-
formation for phrase judgement. Compared with PSSE, P3
can reduce the time cost, especially when the query length
is less than 8. This is because PSSE needs two rounds of
interaction between the user and the cloud server, and during
the second interaction, it needs to generate a trapdoor for each
document that was returned in the first interaction. As the
query length increases, the number of documents returned in
the first interaction could drop, which leads to a fall of the
trapdoor generation time for PSSE.
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Fig. 4. Search accuracy with varying document sets and query lengths
Fig. 5. Trapdoor generation time for different
query lengths (m = 2500).
Fig. 6. Search time for different query lengths
(m = 2500).
Fig. 7. Search time for different numbers of
indexed documents (|Q| = 2).
Query Time. The query time is defined as the time interval
from the submission of a user’s trapdoor to the receival of the
search results. For each queried phrase, we repeat the query
20 times and calculate the average search time to mitigate the
deviation caused by uncertain factors. Note that PSSE may
result in a huge index size (cf. Table III), which cannot be
loaded completely into the memory used in our experiments.
Therefore, we enable the query algorithms of P3 and PSSE
to dynamically load the partial index.
Fig. 6 shows the relationship between the search time and
the query length. The conjunctive search scheme takes the
shortest search time. However, such a scheme cannot provide
accuracy guarantees as discussed in Section VI-B. As to the
phrase search schemes, P3 can roughly reduce the average
search time of PSSE by half. This is because PSSE has a
large index size and thereby spends more time than P3 on
loading its index into the memory.
The search time with different document scales is shown in
Fig. 7. Here, we exhibit only the results for |Q| = 2 due
to space limitation. The search time for each of the three
methods enlarges with the growth of the number of documents.
Compared with PSSE, P3 can greatly reduce the average
search time for different scales of document sets.
Communication overhead. The communication time and
data volumes are depicted in Fig. 8. The communication time
means the transmission time of the trapdoors and search results
between the client and the cloud server. As the the number of
indexed documents grows, the communication time becomes
higher for all three methods. In particular, P3 has the shortest
communication time, because P3 has the smallest data volume.
First, P3 has a higher search accuracy than the conjunctive
search scheme, and thereby gets a smaller volume of search
results that should be replied from the cloud server to the
client. Second, compared with PSSE, P3 only needs one-round
of interaction and avoids sending intermediate data to the client
for phrase recognition.
VII. DISCUSSION
Although the proposed scheme is more efficient than the
existing phrase search schemes, there are still two limitations.
First, compared with the conjunctive search scheme, P3
has to spend more time on phrase recognition, and thereby
increases search time. Second, P3 cannot directly support a
flexible index update due to the inherent feature of the inverted
index and the adoption of the padding strategy.
A possible way to mitigate these limitations is leveraging
the parallel processing techniques over server clusters. We can
partition the whole document set into several subsets, each of
which contain partial documents and is indexed independently.
Given a phrase query from the user, search operations can be
performed in parallel over the subsets, which helps to shorten
the search time. An offline update of the secure index can
be employed to deal with updates, e.g., add or remove of
documents and keywords. In particular, when a document has
to be updated, we only need to re-generate the index of the
corresponding subset which the document belongs to, thereby
reducing the index update overhead. We leave these attempts
for the future work.
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Fig. 8. Communication overhead with different numbers of documents (|Q| = 2).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel scheme, P3, which tack-
led the challenges in phrase search for intelligent encrypted
data processing in cloud-based IoT. The scheme exploits the
homomorphic encryption and bilinear map to determine the
pairwise location relationship of queried keywords on the
cloud server side. It eliminates the need of a trusted third
party and greatly reduces communication overheads. Thorough
security analysis illustrated that the proposed scheme provides
the desired security guarantees. The experimental evaluation
results demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of the
proposed scheme. In future work, we plan to further improve
the flexibility and efficiency of the scheme.
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